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Abstract
Populist parties are likely to gain consensus when mainstream parties and status
quo institutions fail to manage the shocks faced by their economies. Institutional
constraints, which limit the possible actions in the face of shocks, result in poorer
performance and frustration among voters who turn to populist movements. We rely
on this logic to explain the different support of populist parties among European
countries in response to the globalization shock and to the 2008-2011 financial and
sovereign debt crisis. We predict a greater success of populist parties in response to
these shocks in Euro zone countries, and our empirical analysis confirms this predic-
tion. This is consistent with voters’ frustration for the greater inability of the Euro
zone governments to react to difficult-to-manage globalization shocks and financial
crises. Our evidence has implications for the speed of construction of political unions.
A slow, staged process of political unification can expose the EU to a risk of political
backlash if hard to manage shocks hit the economies during the integration process.
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1 Introduction
Our goal in this paper is to show that the effects of globalization and the financial crisis
on voting for populist parties in a European country crucially depends on whether or not
such a country belongs to the Euro-zone (EZ henceforth). We claim that both globaliza-
tion and the financial crisis have stronger effects on perceived economic insecurity in EZ
countries than in the rest of Europe. Building on empirical literature documenting the link
between economic insecurity and populism, we conjecture that fear of economic insecurity
drives the success of populist parties across regions. There are two main intuitive reasons
that lead us to think that economic insecurity grew significantly more in EZ countries: first,
the greater difficulty of EZ countries’ policy makers in responding to a shock, due to greater
constraints in terms of fiscal and monetary policy; second, the greater incentive for Western
firms to relocate production from EZ to Eastern European countries. We will make these
two intuitions precise and we will provide strong evidence in favor of our hypothesis.
Before we explain our hypothesis about the differential effects of shocks on fear of
economic insecurity across countries, we summarize the recently established connections
between economic insecurity and populism. A large number of recent papers have uncov-
ered the importance of economic insecurity shocks to explain the recent wave of populism
– see Guiso, Herrera, Morelli and Sonno (2017) and references therein. Algan et al. (2017)
showed that the EU regions where unemployment rose during the crisis saw the sharpest
decline of trust in institutions and establishment politics. Dustman et al. (2017) highlight
how the populist vote is related to this distrust in institutions and in particular EU institu-
tions. Foster and Frieden (2017) nuance this result showing that this correlation is stronger
in debtor countries. Colantone and Stanig (2017) have highlighted the significant role of
the fear of the effects of globalization, the so called “China effect” in continental Europe.
The regions where manufacturing plays an important role are the regions where the fear
of losing a job due to Chinese competition is highest, and such regions are those where
nationalistic sentiments and protection demand kick in the most.1 The explanation of this
finding given in Guiso et al. (2017) is that populism is a three-part phenomenon: (1) anti-
elite rhetoric; (2) immediate protection offer; (3) hiding the future costs of the protection
policies proposed.2 For the specific case of the globalization effect, the way this three-part
theory works is as follows: the reduction in wages, prices and employment opportunities in
Western countries creates a first direct effect in terms of immediate perception of economic
insecurity. Such an economic insecurity perception, if protracted and pervasive, reduces
trust in current government policies and institutions and reduces voter turnout. Then,
if there is a widespread perception that neither market-driven policies nor government-
based ones work particularly when the institutional constraints make it even harder for
government policies to counter the crisis, populist supply arises, tempting voters with an
easy protection strategy (such as trade barriers, building a wall to protect from migrants,
or exit from the Euro-zone). Such protection policies are “insulated”! from future cost
considerations through the populist manipulation strategies: everybody who talks about
future costs or relatively complex solutions (as required by the nature of the problems)
1These papers study the role of insecurity for the demand of populism. Rodrik (2017) and Guiso et al.
(2017) also highlight the role of economic insecurity shocks for the supply of populism.
2See Encyclopedia Britannica (2015) as well: http://www.britannica.com/topic/populism
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is simply depicted as part of the elite and should not be listened to. The same sequence
of effects and demand-supply interactions is at play for any form of economic insecurity
shocks, including those that can be related to the financial crisis and simultaneous debt
crisis in Europe.
This paper shows that the greater impact of a global crisis on populism in EZ countries
than in non-EZ countries is due to two effects, which we call “policy strait-jacket” effect
(PSJ henceforth) and the “ relocation” effect.
The PSJ effect relates to the fact that EZ countries have limited policy space in terms
of fiscal policy (given the various EZ rules) and no independent monetary policy to counter
country-specific shocks.3 If this PSJ effect is a significant factor in determining voters’
frustration, which leads them to vote for a populist party, then we should see a significant
difference in populist votes between EZ countries and non-EZ countries even controlling
for GDP and time spent in the Union. Moreover, within the EZ we should see a positive
correlation between each measure of PSJ and the increase in populist voting after a crisis
- such as a financial crisis - that would have normally required counter cyclical policy
responses. We provide both of these tests in the paper, hence confirming the importance
of the PSJ perception on voters’ decisions.
The relocation effect relates, instead, to firms’ responses to a competitiveness crisis
like the crisis produced by exposure to globalization. The recognized positive impact of
the China effect on populist voting (Steiner, 2012; Autor et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2017;
Colantone and Stanig, 2017; Colantone and Stanig, 2017b; Jensen et al., 2016), changes
dramatically when the EZ distinction is introduced. The positive effect on populist voting
goes through the interaction with the EZ dummy: once this interaction effect is considered,
the China effect remains positive for EZ countries but changes sign for Eastern European
countries. This sign switch can be explained in part on the basis of relocation incentives
and the pattern of inflow and outflow of jobs. Outside the EZ there is less PSJ related
frustration, but, on top of this, some countries in the Eastern part of Europe may actually be
“receivers” of firms relocating away from EZ countries. The low cost of production in China
and other Asian countries has been highlighted in the literature and media as the main
threat in a world of free trade and globalization, but obviously reality is more “continuous”:
costs of labour and production are clearly much higher in Italy than in China. However,
there is a wide range of variability for these costs for countries “in between”, and when a
firm decides to relocate away from a high labour cost and high tax country it may consider
a variety of factors, leading to a decision to relocate plants to Hungary, Romania or Serbia
rather than going all the way to another continent. Thus, even if a manufacturing region of
Romania were to be equally threatened by Chinese competition as a similar Italian region,
the former expects an inflow of jobs from (say) Italian firms, compensating the potential
Chinese shock effects.
Imagine a voter in an EZ country who observes that (1) national and multinational firms
are moving to lower cost countries and (2) their governments are not able to stop them
through tax cuts or subsidies or competitive devaluations (PSJ effect). These circumstances
3The importance of idiosyncratic shocks and the induced volatility within the EZ is well documented.
See Luque, Morelli and Tavares (2014) and Fahri and Werning (2017) for the phenomenon of increased
volatility in the Euro-zone that has been caused by such policy constraints.
3
create economic insecurity and frustration, which make populist alternatives relatively more
tempting. The market based reasoning and the institutional policy constraint reasoning can
also reinforce each other: a firm that decides to relocate away from Italy expects the policy
making authorities of a country outside the Euro-zone to be able to respond with greater
flexibility to shocks, using monetary as well as fiscal incentives, and these institutional
flexibility effects are considered a valuable addition to the lower costs effect.
We will test our general differential hypothesis not only by using the globalization shock,
but also by focusing on the financial crisis. A region’s vulnerability to an external financial
shock also depends on the financial dependence of the industries operating in the region.
Weighing the external financial dependence of each manufacturing industry (obtained from
Rajan and Zingales, 1998) by the labour share of that industry in a given region, we
can obtain a measure of financial stress for the citizens of that region. The frustration
hypothesis has a clear prediction: regions belonging to EZ countries with more financially
dependent firms should suffer more insecurity as a consequence of the crisis and thus vote
disproportionately for populist parties relative to comparable regions in non-EZ countries.
Our empirical findings are remarkably consistent with the narrative outlined above. We
document that both the globalization shock and the financial crisis shock have boosted
support for populist parties in industrial regions belonging to EZ countries significantly
more than in similar regions in non-EZ countries. The difference in populist consensus in EZ
regions with respect to regions in Eastern European countries reflects the relocation effect;
the difference with respect to regions in non-EZ Western countries reflects the straitjacket
hypothesis. We estimate that the latter can explain 74% of the effects of the globalization
shock in EZ regions compared to regions of Western non-EZ countries. Similarly, while we
find that the financial crisis increased populist consensus across all regions of Europe - both
Eastern and Western, in EZ and non-EZ countries - we find that the effect is three times
larger in Eurozone regions. To shed light on the mechanism, we exploit variation across EZ
countries in terms of the bite of the policy strait jacket, looking at constraints on exchange
rate, fiscal and monetary policy. We show that populist consensus in response to the
globalization shock and following the financial crisis is significantly stronger in EZ countries
where the constraints on policy are more binding. Finally, we document that where these
constraints were tighter people frustration (measured by mistrusts in European institutions
such as the Parliament and the European Central Bank) has increased the most. We find
instead no evidence of frustration in countries that enjoy more discretion in setting the
policy agenda.
All these results are consistent with the view that the deep cause of populism cannot be
culture, it is economics. This view is confirmed by our complementary study (Guiso, Her-
rera, Morelli and Sonno (2017)), which uses individual survey data, based on the European
Social Survey. We show that the populist drive comes from the barely-coping that have
developed a disgust with the political establishment prompting them to abstain from vot-
ing, and a disgust from immigrants which has prompted them to vote populist. However,
behind this deterioration in these “cultural” attitudes is the worsening of economic inse-
curity: voters who suffer from economic misfortune lose faith in institutions and develop
anti-immigrant sentiments. Hence, economic insecurity drives up the populist vote both
directly but also indirectly by affecting two key sentiments: anti-immigration and distrust
for traditional politics. The cultural backlash against globalization, traditional politics and
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institutions, immigration and automation cannot be an exogenous occurrence, it is driven
by economic woes. In fact, as we show, in regions where globalization was present but has
benefited economically there is no such cultural backlash at all and the populist message
has had retreated. The policy implication and take-home message that stems from our
results is clear: if one wants to defeat populism, one must defeat first economic insecurity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical roots of
the two main drivers of our differential hypothesis; Section 3 describes our data collection
and measuring choices; Section 4 contains our empirical results. Section 5 concludes and
discusses policy implications.
2 Conceptual Framework
In this section we provide a theoretical basis for the main hypothesis of the paper, giving
a rationale for the PSJ related frustration effects and relocation incentives.
2.1 Frustration Effect
Consistent with expressive voting theories, the decision of voters to abstain or vote for
new untested alternatives is affected by the performance of parties in power and existing
institutions at times of crisis. Specifically, a common source of frustration among voters is
the lack of simple ready solutions to the threats posed by the globalization and financial
crisis shocks. Voters who are most frustrated by the perceived inability of parties and
institutions to respond to a crisis are more likely to buy the “exit from the Euro” solution
proposed by the populist rhetoric, and disregard the intricate (and more complicated to
understand) negative consequences of such a solution. The truth may be that there is no
quick and easy solution for the globalization, immigration and automation phenomena (and
consequent loss of income problems), but people, perhaps understandably, don’t want to
hear that. The drivers of this behavioral pattern are similar to the drivers of other belief
formation and simple fix desire phenomena: for instance, despite having been proven wrong,
the belief that vaccines causes autism persists, with dramatic longer-term consequences as
the rebirth of small epidemics of diseases that had been eradicated. The most effective way
to discredit this unfounded belief would be to say “We know the real cause of autism: this
is the cause of autism, not vaccines.” However, the truth is: there is no understood cause of
autism. This lack of a clear alternative explanation helps the wrong belief about vaccines
to persist . Similarly, there is no agreed-upon explanation for and no easy to implement
solution to the costs imposed by fast globalization and immigration (Rodrik, 2017), leaving
the door open to illusory explanations or solutions.
This “behavioral” frustration should be stronger in countries within the Euro-zone: the
fiscal policy constraints imposed by European rules determines lower expected effective-
ness and credibility of political promises by traditional parties, and traditional devaluation
measures are obviously impossible; as a reverse of the medal effect, the simple populist
proposals in terms of protectionism and exit from the Euro have great relative impact.
This aspect has become particularly salient in the aftermath of the great recession. The
great recession affected all countries in Europe, both Eastern and Western, but the lack
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of policy tools to respond to individual country idiosyncratic shocks was particularly evi-
dent within the Eurozone. The Eurozone rules imposed much stricter constraints on both
the fiscal side and the monetary side, which made the response to the crisis less effective
– causing the subsequent Euro debt crisis . The so called austerity generated a sense of
frustration in voters, which was present to a lesser extent in non-EZ countries such as the
UK, Norway or Sweden. We will document empirically the link between frustration and
the policy strait-jacket in Section 4.3.
2.2 Relocation Effect
A firm producing in a Western European country (henceforth WE) – Italy or the UK
to fix ideas in the discussion below – may decide to relocate to Eastern Europe (henceforth
EE) in order to lower costs of production – e.g., think of Romania. This move evidently
entails relocation costs which may be heterogenous across firms. If the relocation option
becomes more profitable after the China-effect or a crisis lowering prices, then, depending
on their relocation cost, certain firms will find it profitable to relocate.
The key to this relocation timing argument is that profit erosion after Chinese entry,
though clearly present both in WE and EE, is larger for a firm located in WE than in EE.
In Appendix A, we show that under very simple assumptions the latter is true, thus strong
enough Chinese competition causes ex-post relocation. The stronger the competition the
larger the incentives to relocate.
Within WE there are EZ countries such as Italy, and non-EZ countries like Sweden
or the UK. The loss of competitiveness of their products due to Chinese entry will result
in depreciation pressure on their currencies, which should, in turn, lower production costs
with respect to global demand and partly help regain some competitiveness. However this
compensation through depreciation will be stronger in countries like the UK which, not
being part of the EZ, can count on exchange rate devaluations. Thus, EZ countries, such
as Italy, will suffer more from relocation after Chinese entry than non-EZ countries, such
as Sweden or the UK.
The populist support is linked to the loss of job opportunities, which in turn is linked
to the loss of competitiveness and firm relocation expectations. The drop in labor demand
due to the globalization shock causes distrust on the traditional parties that have not been
able to address or smooth this shock. In EZ countries this is aggravated by the PSJ effect.
The populist parties offer a simple alternative, which in regular time would be recognized
as too risky, but gains traction in times of crisis and frustration.
2.3 Summing the Effects
The recession affected all countries, but should have provoked a greater frustration
within the Eurozone, because of the inability of the EZ countries to respond effectively to
the crisis due to the austerity rules. This PSJ effect may have even prolonged the crisis by
several years, making it evolve into a major debt crisis in several EZ countries.
The second source of differences in political effects of crises is the relocation incentives
for firms from WE to EE, which affect these two regions very differently. In EE countries,
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like Romania, workers had a compensating inflow of firms from Germany, Italy and so
forth, making the manufacturing regions of Romania suffer less (or possibly benefit, on
net) from globalization and the China shock. The rise of nationalism in EE at the country
level is supported primarily by xenophobic fears or race related issues, rather than by
globalization-induced competition in the manufacturing sector, as in WE.
The two effects push frustration differentials – and hence voting incentive differentials
– in the same direction. A worker in a manufacturing region in an EZ country fears job
stability and negative wage effects of globalization or a financial crisis, and this fear is
amplified when national and multinational companies close production plants to open one
somewhere else. Seeing that EZ rules make it difficult to respond with fiscal subsidies for
firms or other policies at the national level, seeing that at the same time EU level coun-
tercyclical policies do not find support, the worker’s fears become frustration with existing
institutions and parties that took part in the construction of those, and this frustration
makes this worker willing to endorse anti-system proposals. On the other hand, a worker
in a manufacturing region of an EE country outside the Euro zone if anything sees firms ar-
rive rather than leave, and sees no major policy constraint to eliminate. Hence the relative
fear of economic insecurity is diminished by globalization shocks and policy ineffectiveness
frustration effects do not kick in. Other fears are made salient by populist parties in EE
countries, but the reversal of the two effects highlighted in this paper makes us predict that
the globalization effects should have the opposite sign for EE countries.
3 Data Description
In this section we provide a general description of the data and indicators used, namely
our dependent variable, the electoral data, and our main explanatory measures of glob-
alization shock and financial dependence, as well as measures of frustration and policy
constraints. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main variables that we will de-
scribe below, for the effects of the globalization shocks and that of financial dependence.
Table 3 lists the populist parties (defined as described below).
Electoral data. The European Election Database4 provides electoral results at local
level for a number of European countries. Data are available according to the NUTS clas-
sification of European regions. In our research we will rely on the most disaggregated level,
namely NUTS3, to better capture the importance of local factors for populist consensus
documented in the literature (e.g. Autor et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2017; Colantone and
Stanig, 2017). Overall, our dataset comprises electoral results for 23 European countries
at the NUTS3 level, ranging from 2000 to 2015 (see Table 2). Populist parties, as in
Guiso et al. (2017), are defined according to the time-varying classification by Van Kessel
(2015). Van Kessel defines a party as populist if it a) portrays “the people” as virtuous
4Disclaimer from the data source: “Some of the data applied in the analysis in this publication are based
on material from the European Election Database”. The data are collected from original sources, prepared
and made available by the NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD). NSD are not responsible
for the analyses/interpretation of the data presented here http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_
database/about/”.
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and essentially homogeneous; b) advocates popular sovereignty, as opposed to elitist rule;
c) defines itself as against the political establishment, which is alleged to act against the
interest of the people. To identify populist parties Van Kessel uses primary sources such
as party manifestos and speeches, and to corroborate the validity of the resulting populist
classification, he also asks a pool of country experts to validate or reject it by answering
an ad hoc questionnaire.
Exposure to globalization. Our index of exposure to globalization is inspired by
measures used in the literature, such as Autor et al. (2016) and Colantone and Stanig
(2017), with some modifications. For each region in our sample we construct an indicator
of exposure to globalization (labeled GS - mnemonic for globalization shock) by first com-
puting the rise in imports from China in each manufacturing industry at the country level
and then attributing these measures to each region using the regional occupational weights
in the various manufacturing sectors. Formally, our globalization shock measure in region
r, in country c at time t is defined as:
GScrt =
L
m
cr(pre−sample)
Lcr(pre−sample)
×
∑
s
L
m
crs(pre−sample)
L
m
cr(pre−sample)
∆IMP (China)
m
cst
L
m
cs(pre−sample)
where L
m
cr(pre−sample) is the number of workers in aggregate manufacturing in region r of
country c, Lcr(pre−sample) is the total employment in region r of country c, L
m
crs(pre−sample) and
L
m
cs(pre−sample) are the number of workers in the manufacturing sector s in region r and in the
whole country c respectively. All occupational figures are taken at the pre-sample period.
Finally, ∆IMP (China)
m
cst is the (value) change in real imports of sector s from China to
country c in year t over the last n years. The measure captures the exposure of the region
to the China shocks through two channels: the regional composition of the manufacturing
industry and the relative size of manufacturing in the region. The larger the weight of
import-intensive manufacturing sectors, the more exposed the region is, holding constant
the relative size of manufacturing. Holding constant industry structure, exposure increases
with the relative size of manufacturing. Although mathematically redundant in the formula,
the double weighting first within manufacturing and then as aggregate manufacturing on the
total regional employment is justified by our data structure. Disaggregated employment
data at sectorial level (L
m
crs(pre−sample)) are only available for NUTS2 regions, while the
aggregated manufacturing measures (L
m
cr(pre−sample)) are available also at NUTS3. In order
to conduct our analysis, we use NUTS2 level occupational weights for the manufacturing
sector and NUTS3 data on the relative size of manufacturing (i.e. compute the term
L
m
cr(pre−sample)
Lcr(pre−sample)
using NUTS3 data). The import data are collected from COMEXT and UN
COMTRADE (for Norway), while the labour data come from EUROSTAT, INSEE (for
France), and SSB (for Norway). In our analysis, the pre-sample period is year 2000 (right
before entry of China in the World Trade Organization ) and the import change is computed
over two years (n = 2).
Following the literature, in order to clean our globalization measure from the possible
endogeneity due to both a supply effect of Chinese imports and a demand effect of Euro-
pean regions, we build an instrument replacing import from China in European countries
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with US imports from China in the equation above, and dividing the change in real im-
ports by the number of US workers in the manufacturing sector s, always taken at the
pre-sample value. Data on US imports are collected from the UN COMTRADE, data on
US employment are sourced from the OECD.
Exposure to financial crisis. This measure builds on the concept of external financial
dependence developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Intuitively, regions whose industries
are more dependent on external finance are also more vulnerable to financial shocks.5 Using
detailed data on employment in manufacturing from EUROSTAT, INSEE (for France), and
SSB (for Norway), we devise a regional-specific measure of exposure to the financial crisis.
The idea is to weigh the external dependence of each manufacturing industry by the labour
share of that industry in a given region. More formally, our measure is defined as:
Findepcrt =
L
m
crt
Lcrt
×
∑
s
L
m
crst
L
m
crt
× ExtDepms
where
L
m
crt
Lcrt
is the labour share of aggregate manufacturing with respect to the total em-
ployment in region r of country c, L
m
crst/L
m
crt is the labour share within manufacturing of
sector s in region r of country c at time t and ExtDep
m
s is the Rajan and Zingales (1998)
measure of financial dependence of the manufacturing sector s in the United States, used
to identify the technological component of a firm’s need to rely on external finance.
In our estimates the measures described above will be interacted with a Eurozone (EZ )
dummy variable, set to 1 if the region is in a country belonging to the Eurozone in a given
year covered by our sample. Variation in membership come from the fact that in a given
year some countries are part of the Eurozone and others are not and from the fact that
a given country that at the beginning of the sample is not part of the Eurozone joins it later.
Policy strait-jacket. To measure the bite of constraints that participating in the single
currency imposes on national policies we construct three measures. The first captures the
loss of discretion in devaluing the currency when domestic goods lose competitiveness.
Clearly, belonging to the single currency does not allow competitive devaluations. This
type of constraint was probably particularly important when EZ countries were losing
competitiveness as a consequence of globalization. To capture this, we would ideally like to
measure the distance between the current exchange rate (Euro-Dollar) and an hypothetical
exchange rate that each country would choose to balance the current account. Computing
the latter is not trivial and different methodologies seem to give different results (see Isard,
2007). However, we can measure country competitiveness using the estimated real effective
5The Rajan-Zingales measure of financial dependence to capture exposure to the financial crisis is only
one and may be subject to criticism. It has however two advantages: it is readily available and it has
been tested in many paper with data covering many disparate countries, using industry level or firms level
data and it has proved to be a very reliable and robust indicator. We thought about how to measure
local exposure to a financial shock and searched for alternative measures (e.g. households leverage in the
years before the crisis) but found no information at the NUTS3 level. Because of the data constraints and
because of the robust past performance of the rajan-Zingales measure we have decided to rely on the later
for our exercise.
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exchange rate (REER) of a country vis a` vis the trading partners and assume that the
distance between the hypothetical and actual exchange rate would increase with the loss
of competitiveness. Accordingly, as a proxy of the PSJ along this dimension we use the
loss of competitiveness between 1995 and 2007 as computed by Eurostat. We compute the
loss during this time interval to isolate the loss in competitiveness when globalization was
unfolding from dynamics in competitiveness during the financial crisis. As a robustness, we
show results using the loss in competitiveness between 1995 and 2000, before China entered
the WTO, to better capture the consequence of the globalization shock on countries that
faced the shock with different initial competitive strengths. Table 4 shows the change in
REER by Eurozone country in our sample, while Table 1 presents its relative descriptive
statistics for the full sample. We call this indicator PSJex, a mnemonic for policy strait-
jacket on the exchange rate.
Our second PSJ measure captures constraints on domestic fiscal policy. Constraints on
fiscal policy are formalized in the Stability and Growth Pact requiring each member state
to implement a fiscal policy aiming for the country to stay within the limits on government
deficit (3% of GDP) and debt (60% of GDP). And if the stock of debt exceeds the 60% level
it should each year decline with a satisfactory pace. Accordingly, the PSJ can be measured
by the deviation of the stock of debt from the 60% target and by the deviation of the
current deficit from the 3% threshold. The larger the difference between the current stock
of debt (current deficit) from its target level debt (3% target deficit/GDP) the greater the
PSJ.
The third indicator captures lack of discretion in setting monetary policy. To estimate
the extent of the bite of the common monetary policy, we compute the difference between
a country optimal Taylor rule and the ECB policy rule for each country in the EZ (as in
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2017). Policy constraints on fiscal and monetary policy are
more likely to be felt when a country is hit by specific shocks that require country-level
demand management policies. A financial crisis shock, more than a globalization shock,
is arguably better managed if a country can tailor its fiscal and monetary response to the
severity of the shock in the country. The Stability and Growth Pact limits this discretion.
To capture the fiscal PSJ during the financial crisis we compute the deviations of govern-
ment debt and deficits from the 60% and 3% thresholds as of 2007, right before the financial
crisis hits or taking a three years average (2005, 2006 and 2007). The deviations from the
Taylor rule are instead computed using all the years after 2007 when the bite of the single
monetary policy can be observed. Because EZ countries have no possibility of departing
from the single monetary policy (except by leaving the Euro) this captures well the bite
of the constraint. We then combine the fiscal and monetary policy constraints measures
into a single macro index PSJmacro - by extracting the principle component of the three
indexes (deviation of debt from 60%, deficit from 3% and distance of the EZ common ECB
rate from the national Taylor rule). We will also use the deviation from the Taylor rule
separately, labelling this index PSJmp. Table 4 shows the distribution of these indexes
across EZ countries and Table 1 its descriptive statistics for the full sample over the period
2000-2014.
Frustration. We capture people’s frustration with policy and political institutions
using three measures of average trust among citizens of the countries in our sample: trust
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in the European Parliament, trust in the ECB and trust in the European Commission. We
complement these measures with people’s opinion about the benefits of participating in the
European Union. Data are from Eurobarometer.
4 Empirical Results
In this section we study how different shocks impacted populist electoral outcomes. Our
focus is on the heterogeneous effects within and outside the Euro-zone. In particular, we
analyze the impact of a globalization shock, such as the China effect, and that of a financial
crisis, such as the 2008-2009 credit crisis. Both shocks share the feature of being “hard
to manage”, in the sense that they differ from traditional business cycle shocks, and both
may imply that a country may benefit from enjoying greater flexibility in devising policies
to respond to the shocks. We use variants of the following general specification:
vcrt = α + γ shockrt + β shockrt × eurozonect + FEct +Xrt + rt (1)
where, as before, (c,r,t) identify the country, the NUTS-3 region, and year (of the election),
respectively. The outcome variable vrct is the share of votes obtained by populist parties
in region r in country c in year t; shockrt is either the measure of the China shock or of
the 2008-2009 shock described above; eurozonect indicates whether the country belongs to
the Euro zone; Xrt are a battery of region-year specific controls, notably the rate of GDP
growth in the regions and/or GDP per capita at the beginning of sample. rt is the error
term. FEct are country×year fixed effects, which are equivalent to country-election fixed
effects. These dummies control for all the factors that impact symmetrically all the regions
within the same country in an election (e.g. general political trends, political orientation of
the government, performance of the economy at the national level, political tensions, etc.).
Our test exploits variation in populist voting and exposure to shocks across regions of a
given country, once general cross countries differences in average populist voting have been
netted out by the country-year fixed effects. Hence, these later trends are left unexplained
by our analysis. Instead, drivers of populist voting are identified by comparing voting in
regions that differ in exposure to shocks. This is indeed consistent with existing evidence
that populist voting has a strong local component, which justifies our use of variation across
the most fine geographical units in our dataset (NUTS3).
To study the role of the PSJ we amend the above specification by adding an extra
interaction between the shock and PSJ indicator for the eurozone countries and run variants
of the following regression
vcrt = α+γ shockrt+β shockrt×eurozonect+δ shockrt×eurozonect×PSJxct+FEct+Xrt+rt
(2)
where x = [ex,macro,mp].
One may be concerned that the PSJ measure could be capturing directly the severity
of the crisis itself which might have hit countries with a higher PSJ more severely than
others. This cant be true. Notice that all our regressions include time-country fixed effects
- i.e. a country specific time dummy for each year the country is in the sample. This
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dummies capture any difference across countries in the severity of the shock (either the
financial crisis or the globalization shock) and their effect on voting. The severity could
be caused by the PSJ the country entered the crisis with but this effect is captured by
the time dummies. What the PSJ captures is people resentment for the local effect of the
crisis which tends to be attributed disproportionately to the PSJ in regions that - because
of their local structure - suffered more from the crisis.
4.1 Populism and the Globalization Shock
Table 5 presents the results of equation (1), when shockrt is the measure of globalization
shock induced by China. All the specifications include country-year dummies, and standard
errors are clustered at the NUTS-3 level. We also control for the rate of growth in per capita
GDP in the region. The first-stage estimates of our IV regressions are shown in Appendix C.
They reveal that our instrument and the instrument interacted with the Eurozone dummy
consistently predict the supposedly endogenous variable; the F-statistic of the Kleinbeger-
Paap test does not signal a weakness problem, in line with earlier studies (Autor et al.,
2013; Colantone and Stanig, 2017). To rely on the finer available information, in this
first set of estimates we only include countries for which we have full data on employment
for the manufacturing industry sectors as of year 2000 and for the NATS3 classification;
in addition we restrict the sample of non-Euro countries to Eastern European countries.
These requirements leave us with seven EZ countries (Austria, Germany, Greece, Spain,
France, Italy and the Netherlands) and three non-EZ Eastern European (EE) countries
(Poland, Romania and Slovakia). We complement the data with information on three non-
EZ Western European (WE) countries (Sweden, UK, and Norway). Table 2 shows the list
of countries in our dataset and whether they belong to the Eurozone.
In the first two columns we replicate the result obtained by Colantone and Stanig
(2017),6 namely the positive and significant role of the Chinese imports on populist vote
share in the sample of WE countries in the Euro-zone or not. The first column estimates
a simple OLS model and the second uses an IV approach. Both estimates are positive and
statistically significant (the OLS at the 10% confidence level), showing a positive effect
of import penetration on populist consensus. The IV model results in a higher and more
precisely estimated effect of the globalization shock on populist voting, consistent with the
idea that the instrument helps isolate the dynamics in imports from China that reflects
China increased advantage in producing manufacturing goods compared to local industries
- causing disappointment in local workers and voters. A one standard deviation increase in
imports from China raises the average share of votes to populist parties across European
regions by 17.5% of the sample mean - a non negligible effect.
In the third and forth column we replicate Colantone and Stanig (2017) estimates on
our full sample of countries excluding three non-Euro WE countries, Sweden, Norway and
6We replicate the result of Colantone and Stanig (2017) on a sample as close as possible to theirs, given
the data at our disposal. Namely, we include Austria, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, and the UK. However, a few remarks are needed. First, our dependent variable is different:
populist vote shares instead of polarization (among others, radical right parties’ vote shares). Second, the
time periods considered are different, ours being more recent and including also post-crisis years. Finally,
we use electoral data at the NUTS3 level, while Colantone and Stanig (2017) resort to constituency results.
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the UK, but including the three EE countries. Results are similar to those in the first
two columns, with the IV giving a higher and more precisely estimated marginal effect
than the OLS. The last column shows the IV estimates of equation (1), thus adding the
interaction between imports from China and the Euro-zone dummy. The result is striking.
The coefficient γ measuring the effect of the globalization shock alone becomes negative
and statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, and its absolute size is large. This
coefficient measures the effect of the globalization shock on populist voting in the regions of
non-Euro countries: face value, the globalization shock has lowered consensus to populist
parties in European regions located in countries not belonging to the Euro area that are
more exposed to the shock, an issue we come back to below. The effect of the interaction
terms (δ) is positive, large and highly statistically significant (p-value 0.01). The effect of
the globalization shock on populist voting among EZ countries is the sum of the two effects
- and thus equal to about 4.7. Hence, all the positive effect on populist voting of the China
shock in Europe as a whole is due to the positive effect on voting in EZ countries. In the
regions of these countries a one standard deviation increase in imports from China raises
populist voting by as much as 22% of the populist vote share in regions of the Euro-zone.
Comparing the region within the Euro-zone with the lowest exposure to the globalization
shock and the one with the highest exposure entails a difference in the average share of
votes to populist parties as large as 167% of the sample mean (equal to 6.3%, see Appendix
B for summary statistics in EZ and non-EZ regions separately). In regions outside the
Euro-zone and in EE countries, the globalization shock, far from contributing to a populist
backlash, has actually dampened consensus to populist parties. In the absence of the China
shock, populist parties would have attracted much more consensus than they have actually
been able to attract in those manufacturing regions. One standard deviation increase in
imports from China contributes to contain the populist vote share by 4.9 percentage points,
equivalent to 23% of the average share in these regions (19.9%). This differential effect of
the globalization shock between EZ and non-EZ countries reflects two forces. First, an
opposite (in sign) effect of the globalization shocks in Eastern and Western Europe, with
WE regions suffering a loss of jobs and economic activity after the entry of China. This
is partly because Western firms relocate abroad - particularly in Eastern Europe - in an
attempt to contain labour costs and survive competition from China. Second, there is a
PSJ effect, which ties the hands of EZ countries by limiting the possibility of devaluing the
currency to alleviate competitive pressure.
Before showing evidence of the PSJ we dispel doubts that the negative effect of populist
voting in EE regions is spurious. One objection is that the negative correlation between
populist voting and the globalization shock in EE regions reflects the fact that growth in
the regions most exposed to the China shock was taking place not because of the relocation
effect but for other reasons and this was affecting the voting pattern. This possibility is
attenuated if we compare more similar countries or if we control for the pattern of growth
of the region. Our estimates already control for regional growth, hence any estimated
effect of the globalization shock is net of other independent sources of growth. Table 6
shows additional robustness regressions. The first column runs the regression only for the
regions of the EE countries. The result is unaffected: the effect of the globalization shock
is negative and of the same size as that in Table 5, column 5. The second column restricts
the sample to only Western EZ countries, finding an estimate close to the one implied
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in Table 5, column 5. The third column adds pre-period GDP per capita as a control
in the pooled regression; this leaves results unchanged. The fourth column interacts the
globalization shock in Eastern European regions with a temporal dummy equal to 1 in the
years since the country entered the EU. Admission to the single market has lowered the cost
of relocation of Western firms in regions of Eastern Europe and thus has speeded up the
process. The effect of the globalization shock on populist voting in EE regions before the
enlargement is positive (this is the first estimated coefficient, 16.53); but it turns negative,
large and highly statistically significant after the enlargement. On the other hand the effect
on the EZ countries’ regions is positive and magnified. This evidence lends direct support
to the relocation effect affecting populist voting in EE and WE in opposite directions.
Finally, Table 7 shows that the results are robust to using as instrument variants of
imports from China to the US. In the first column we use as instrument imports from
China to the US dropping the DL sector; the second column excludes sectors DI-DJ; the
third drops sector DF and column 4 excludes sectors DB-DC. Results are unchanged.
The finding that the effect of globalization is positive within the EZ regions and neg-
ative in the non-EZ countries is clearly inconsistent with a voting hypothesis that voters
should be more forgiving of the national government because they understand that their
incapacity to better contrast the globalization shock reflects binding constraints on action
imposed by the Euro-zone, compared to countries that maintain their own currency (e.g.
cannot devalue unilaterally). Instead, they are supportive of the frustration hypothesis that
predicts that voters behavior is not driven by the root cause of the crisis (which remains
a harder to understand consideration), but by the perceived economic insecurity due to
the globalization shock and the proximate, more salient and easier to grasp cause - the
relocation of local firms to other regions and the impediments to adopt those that appear
the optimal policies from a local point of view because of the Euro-zone constraints. Fur-
thermore, this effect can be amplified if voters blame the country elite for having adopted
the Euro in the first place, possibly fueled by populist rhetoric. Even more to the point,
there is evidence7 that, despite the legislation forbids it, EU structural funds have been
used to relocate companies from Western to Eastern countries of the EU-27 - a use that
while probably boosting consensus towards Europe (and national parties) in EE regions,
may have had exactly the opposite effect in Western countries, contributing to disseminate
the beliefs that not only “Europe” limits national discretion in designing policies to tackle
the shock, but even amplifies its effects. Below we offer evidence of a PSJ channel in the
effect of the globalization shock on populist voting.
4.1.1 Policy strait-jacket effects and the globalization shock
To test for the PSJ effects, we follow two strategies: first we contrast EZ countries
in WE and non-EZ countries in WE. Second we interact our PSJex indicator (measuring
heterogeneity in the loss of competitiveness between year 1995 and 2007 in the EZ countries)
with exposure to globalization shocks in EZ regions. Table 8 adds Sweden to the sample.
Sweden is a non-Euro non-EE country and this allows us to separate the PSJ effect from
the relocation effect that are instead bundled together when we compare EZ with non-EZ
7See Financial Times, “Questions surround EU relocations”, by Cynthia O’Murchu and Andrew Ward,
December 1, 2010
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EE countries as in Table 5. Because Sweden does not belong to the Euro but has an
industry structure that is comparable to that of WE countries, it is similarly exposed to
the China shock and is not a relocation destination. Thus, the difference in the effect of
the China shock on populist consensus between EZ regions and Swedish regions captures
the PSJ effect of belonging to the Euro-zone. To quantify this effect we add the interaction
between a dummy for Sweden and the China shock (and instrument it in the usual way,
see Appendix C for the first stage regressions). The result is reported in the first column.
The globalization shock has the same impact on populist voting in the EZ regions and the
EE ones, as in Table 5. However, the effect of the globalization shock on populist voting in
Sweden is smaller than in the Euro-zone and the difference is both economically (difference
in coefficient 3.5) and statistically significant (p-value 0.015, reported in the last row at
the bottom of the table). Assuming that the incentive to relocate firms to Eastern Europe
in response to the globalization shock was in Sweden as strong as in WE countries, the
difference between the two effects can be interpreted as reflecting the effect of the constraints
on policy due to the single currency. Hence, the latter accounts for about 74% of the effect
of the globalization shock on populist voting in the EZ regions. To make sure that what
we are measuring is not a reflection of having restricted the comparison to a single non-EZ
Western country, we also add the UK in column 2 and Norway in column 3. Results are
unaffected: in all these countries the populist voting response to the globalization shock is
smaller than in the regions of EZ countries, consistent with the strait-jacket hypothesis.8
The regressions in the last two columns show evidence of a PSJ effect by adding to
the baseline specification the interaction between the globalization shock and the index
PSJex proxying for the bite of the single exchange rate for the Eurozone countries. Euro
area countries with larger values of PSJex (larger losses of competitiveness) suffer a tighter
constraint on exchange rate policy for the EZ country (for non-EZ countries the index is set
at zero). Column 4 adds an interaction with a dummy equal to 1 for the EZ countries with
a value of PSJex in the top quartile (in the period 2007-1995) and zero otherwise. For these
countries the effect of the globalization shock is significantly larger than the average effect:
one standard deviation increase in the shock increases populist voting in these countries by
as much as 37% of the sample mean, providing direct evidence that perceived constraints
on national policies have mediated the political support to populist parties following the
globalization shock.
8We find that the political backlash has been smaller in the UK regions compared to the regions of
other WE countries of the Euro area. This may appear at odds with the support for “leave” in the Brexit
referendum which is typically interpreted as a reaction to the hardship imposed by the globalization shock
in the industrial districts of the UK (Becker et al., 2017). There is however no contradiction. What we are
testing is the political consequence of the globalization shock in different regions of Europe whose national
policy makers are differentially affected by the constraints on policies imposed by the common currency
- while holding constant country-level trends in populist consensus. Our evidence suggests, net of the
average effect on populist voting that the globalization shock has had in the UK and in the EZ countries,
that it has caused a greater political backlash in a region of a western country that is part of the Euro
than in a region of a western country that is not part of the Euro. If the two regions are similarly exposed
to the China shock (i.e. have a similar economic structure), than the measured difference is (almost) all
traced to the Euro constraints on policy. Extrapolating from this evidence, one could argue that the UK
voters support to Brexit is (also) the reflection of perceived weaker ability of Euro area countries in dealing
with the China shock.
15
As a robustness check, in column 5 we replicate the analysis of column 4 using the
loss in competitiveness between 1995 and 2000, before China entered the WTO, to better
capture the consequence of the globalization shock on countries that tackled the shock
with different initial competitive strengths. Results are qualitatively and quantitatively
the same.
4.2 Populism and the Financial Crisis
In this section we present the results of the estimates of equation (1) when shockrt
describes the 2008-2009 financial crisis. To capture the effects of the crisis on voting and
test whether there was a differential effect in the Euro area, we need to modify slightly the
specification in equation (1) and use:
vcrt =α + βFindeprc + γF indeprc × shockrt + δ F indeprc × shockrt × Eurozonect+
+ FEct +Xrt + rt
(3)
In this specification Findeprc is the Rajan-Zingales measure of financial dependence in
region r country c, and is time invariant. shock is a dummy equal to 1 for the years after
2008 following the collapse of Lehman Brothers; it is meant to capture the first wave of the
financial crisis as well as the European sovereign debt crisis. Eurozone is a dummy equal
to 1 for the regions belonging to Eurozone countries. We would expect that regions with
industries that are more dependent on external finance are hit harder by a financial crisis,
causing more economic insecurity and possibly more support for populist parties - i.e. γ > 0.
But if the frustration/PSJ hypothesis is true, then the effect on populist support should
be particularly strong for regions in EZ countries, that is δ > 0. This is the key parameter
of interest. Table 9 shows the results of OLS estimates of the above equation. The first
column only controls for financial dependence in the region; the correlation with populist
voting is positive and statistically significant, but its effect is hard to interpret. The second
column adds the interaction between the financial crisis dummy and financial dependence.
The effect is strongly positive and statistically very significant, consistent with the idea that
the economic insecurity induced by financial crisis - which is stronger in regions with more
financially dependent industries - may boost support for populist parties. At the sample
mean of financial dependence (0.044) the 2008 financial crisis increases the share of votes
to populist parties in a region by 3.96 percentage points (0.044×88.09), equivalent to 42%
of the sample mean. This is a considerable effect. Most importantly, this positive effect
stems mostly from the consensus to populist parties in the Euro-zone. This is shown in the
third column by the large, positive and highly significant value of δ - the differential effect
of the crisis on populist voting in the EZ regions. When the triple interaction is added as a
control, the direct effect of the crisis (keeping the financial dependence constant at its mean
value of 0.044) on populist voting in non-EZ regions (the estimated value of γ) is positive
and statistically significant at the 10% confidence level but much smaller than the average
effect in column 2 (coefficient size 39.07, standard error 20.05). The effect in the EZ regions
is instead large (110.64=39.07+71.57) and implies an effect of the crisis on populist voting
of 4.9 percentage points, 52% of the sample average share of votes. This pattern confirms
the validity of the frustration hypothesis, which predicts that support of populist parties
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reflects voters disappointment with the national governments for their inability to react to
the crisis, and voters’ holding governments responsible for having tied their hands to the
European project and the constraints on the policy space that it entails.
4.2.1 Policy strait-jacket effects and the financial crisis shock
To shed light on this interpretation we use our measures of policy constraints on macro
policies PSJmacro that, as discussed in Section 3, combines constraints on fiscal policy and
on monetary policy for EZ countries. To test whether these constraints play a role we
modify the previous specification and estimate the following model
vcrt =α + βFindeprc + γF indeprc × shockrt + δ F indeprc × shockrt × Eurozonect+
λFindeprc × PSJmacro−zct + θ F indeprc × shockrt × PSJmacro−zct +
FEct +Xrt + rt
(4)
where we have added to the specification an interaction with a dummy for whether PSJmacroct
is above a certain threshold z (using respectively the 75th and the 90th percentile of the
distribution across the EZ countries). The parameter of interest is now θ which should
be positive and significant to be consistent with the PSJ hypothesis. A positive θ in fact
implies that the financial crisis has a stronger effect on populist voting within the eurozone
in precisely those countries where the policy strait jacket has a stronger bite. The results
of the estimates of this model are shown in Table 10. In columns 1 and 3 we construct
PSJmacroct using the deviation of government debt and deficit from the Stability and Growth
Pact thresholds in 2007; in columns 2 and 4 using the three year average prior to 2008. In
the first column the effect of the financial crisis in non-EZ countries regions, measured at
the sample mean of financial dependence, is estimated now at 39.51× 0.044, only slightly
larger than that estimated in Table 9, column 3 (39.07×0.044). The effect on Eurozone re-
gions (at the mean of financial dependence) is (39.515−10.657+96.064×PSJmacroct )×0.044
and it size depends on the bite of constraints on macro policies. The political effect of the
financial crisis is to increase populist voting in the EZ regions by 1.27 percentage points
(13% of the sample mean) in regions of countries with a value of PSJmacroct below the 75th
percentile; by 5.5 percentage points (59 percent of the sample mean) in regions whose coun-
try measure of the PSJ is above the 75th percentile. The estimates in the second column
produce similar results. The last two columns repeat the exercise using the three year
average deviation of government debt and deficit from the Stability and Growth Pact prior
to 2008 to construct PSJmacro−zct . Results are very similar.
In sum, this evidence lends clear support to the strait-jacket hypothesis.
4.3 Frustration and the Policy Strait-Jacket Hypothesis
Finally, we close the circle by showing evidence that voters frustration and constraints on
policy are related. Specifically, our narrative implies that in countries where the bite of the
constraints on domestic policies from participating in the single currency is stronger, voters
should show an increase in frustration and a more skeptical attitude towards European
institutions, particularly in the years following the financial crisis when the loss of discretion
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in using domestic macroeconomic policy is more evident. To document frustration we use
three measures of trust towards European institutions (the European Parliament, the ECB
and the European Commission) and a measure of beliefs about membership in the European
Union (share of people that think membership is good). Trends in these variables since year
2000 are reported in Figures 1-4. The trends are reported separately for EZ countries and for
non-EZ Western and non-EZ Eastern European countries (since they acquired membership
in the Union). The most remarkable feature is the drop in confidence in all these institutions
in the EZ countries with a negative or attenuated dynamic starting already in mid-2004,
and a sharp negative trend after the start of the financial crisis and during the European
sovereign debt crisis. The drop is either absent or much more moderate in non-Euro
countries. In EZ countries trust in the European parliament in 2014 is almost 30 percentage
points lower than in year 2000 (Figure 1). In Western and Eastern non-EZ countries it is
10 percentage points above the year 2000 level. Trust in the European Commission shows a
similar differentiated time profile (Figure 3) and so does trust in the ECB (Figure 2). The
only difference is that after several years of increasing values trust in the ECB is revised
downwards in non-EZ countries following the financial crisis; yet its level in 2014 is 30
percentage points above its level in 2000, while it is almost 30 percentages point below in
EZ countries. Simultaneously, there is a loss of enthusiasm for the benefits of staying in
the Union, much more marked in EZ countries (Figure 4). These patterns are consistent
with the policy strait-jacket hypothesis. To lend direct support to this interpretation
we correlate the drop in trust in the three European institutions and in the benefits of
belonging to the union after 2007 with our measure PSJmacro using variation among the EZ
countries in our sample. Figures 5-8 show a systematic negative correlation: in countries
with stronger constraints on policy the drop in trust in the European Parliament, the
European Commission as well as the ECB is decisively more marked, and so is the drop
in the perceived benefit from membership in the EU. The last set of figures (Figures 9-
12) show that the negative correlation holds also if we specialize the PSJ measure to the
constraints on monetary policy, i.e. use PSJmp instead if PSJmacro.9
5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper makes several contributions to the understanding of the determinants of
populism. We have argued and proved that the policy strait-jacket of individual countries
in the Euro zone has a direct first order effect on frustration of citizens with European
institutions and traditional parties associated with them, and such a frustration pushed
voters to support populist platforms. Other Western European countries outside the Euro
displayed significantly lower support for populist parties in regions affected by the various
crises we have witnessed; Eastern European countries benefited from relocation incentives
of firms, and this relocation effect, added to the absence of a policy strait-jacket, caused a
reduction of support for populist parties in the manufacturing regions of such countries.
Our results have broad policy implications for the European integration process. We
have shown that a European Monetary Union without a fiscal and political union creates
9All these correlations are robust to excluding Greece from the sample whose values of PSJmacro and
PSJmp are very far from those of the other countries.
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citizens’ frustration for the inability of individual governments to counter shocks, and this
may lead to a political derailing of even the existing levels of integration. In spite of all the
benefits of monetary integration,10 the incompleteness of the EMU architecture without a
proper fiscal and perhaps political union is often recognized.11 This paper points out that,
to the extent that one considers the current wave of populism an important challenge for
democracy, the imperfect integration of policy making in Europe has significant political
implications. A hypothetical United States of Europe would be able to give faster and more
effective fiscal and monetary policy countercyclical responses, and hence the individual
country level PSJ frustration effects would be eliminated. Moreover, a fiscal union would
reduce tax competition effects, leading to less relocation decisions.
Beside the above implications of our analysis for the discussion on the necessary steps
for EU integration, there are also potential implications in terms of the EU expansion pro-
cess. Much of the relocation consequences of the various shocks we have analyzed seems to
have happened from Western to Eastern European countries; thus, the expansion from 15
to 28 (now 27) countries had an important neglected effect: the profit and job opportunities
related to the firms that no longer found it viable to remain in EZ countries, nevertheless
remained in Europe. Without the expansion to 28 countries it would have been more
costly to relocate a firm in Romania or alike, and hence some firms would have decided
to relocate production all the way to even cheaper labor costs countries in Asia, or alter-
natively to shut down altogether. Further enlargements of the EU therefore could be seen
as desirable, among other reasons, for the fact that expansion eastwards further increases
location choices within the EU for multinational companies, which therefore will continue
to produce corporate revenues in Europe. Advocates of a EU-level corporate sales tax
could further motivate their proposal beyond its redistributive value for its effects on total
welfare. Thus, even though our evidence shows that the EU enlargement fostered support
for populist parties in Western European countries, support could have been even stronger
without the enlargement. Our evidence shows that the enlargement reduced populist con-
sensus in Eastern Europe manufacturing regions, and this effect would have unlikely been
there without the admission of Eastern countries to the European project.
10See e.g. Mundell (1961), Alesina and Barro (2002), and Baldwin and Wyplosz (2006) for an excellent
survey.
11Theoretically, Celentani et al. (2004) show that a set of decentralized fiscal entities can lead to inefficient
risk sharing, even if countries have access to a sequentially complete financial structure of assets. For an
example of policy discussion on the need to complete the Euro-zone institutions with a fiscal union, see e.g.
the report of the Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Group (2012) “Completing the Euro - A road map towards
fiscal union in Europe”. The vulnerability to external shocks when both monetary and fiscal policies are
constrained for individual countries was a known weakness even before the start of the Euro, but the extent
of the problem was not anticipated.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
N mean sd min max
Full sample (excl. SE, NO, UK)
Populist % 2716 10.189 16.013 0.000 73.563
Eurozone (EZ) 2716 0.715 0.451 0.000 1.000
EU 2716 0.890 0.314 0.000 1.000
GDP per capita (1 yr rate) 2190 3.435 6.597 -29.260 42.857
GDP per capita (pre-sample) 2320 17.043 11.330 0.800 81.100
GS 1541 0.185 0.288 -0.377 1.880
GS (US) 1554 0.522 0.468 -0.186 2.220
GS (US, excl. DL) 1554 0.341 0.315 -0.186 1.982
GS (US, excl. DI-DJ) 1554 0.475 0.434 -0.145 2.102
GS (US, excl. DF) 1554 0.521 0.468 -0.186 2.220
GS (US, excl. DB-DC) 1554 0.410 0.384 -0.119 2.144
PSJex07−95 2716 1.103 0.299 0.835 1.848
PSJex00−95 2716 0.975 0.175 0.825 1.385
Full sample (incl. SE, NO, UK)
Populist % 3508 9.297 14.526 0.000 73.563
Eurozone (EZ) 3508 0.554 0.497 0.000 1.000
EU 3508 0.897 0.304 0.000 1.000
GDP per capita (1 yr rate) 2772 3.595 6.318 -29.260 45.000
GDP per capita (pre-sample) 3112 20.744 16.844 0.800 255.800
GS 2193 0.197 0.255 -0.377 1.880
GS (US) 2193 0.475 0.443 -0.186 2.220
GS (US, excl. DL) 2193 0.290 0.303 -0.317 1.982
GS (US, excl. DI-DJ) 2193 0.438 0.403 -0.145 2.102
GS (US, excl. DF) 2193 0.474 0.442 -0.186 2.220
GS (US, excl. DB-DC) 2193 0.382 0.366 -0.166 2.144
PSJex07−95 3508 0.533 0.486 0.000 1.755
PSJex00−95 3508 0.493 0.446 0.000 1.236
Findep 2452 0.044 0.027 0.005 0.134
PSJmacro07 3332 0.198 1.264 -0.452 5.624
PSJmacro05−07 3332 0.197 1.206 -0.497 5.208
Trust variables and PSJ*
Trust in EP 368 53.538 10.889 20.806 73.173
Trust in EC 368 49.431 10.657 17.027 69.860
Trust in ECB 368 48.247 11.749 13.382 79.289
EU membership is good 270 53.342 13.034 24.377 82.337
PSJmp 345 1.036 1.552 0.000 11.065
PSJmacro07 345 0.127 1.099 -0.452 6.552
PSJmacro05−07 345 0.140 1.092 -0.497 6.114
*Summary statistics based on EU28 countries over the 2000-2014 period.
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Table 2: List of Countries and elections
Country ID Country Eurozone Globalization shock Financial dependence Elections
AT Austria Yes Yes Yes 2002 2006 2008
BG Bulgaria No No Yes 2001 2005 2009 2013 2014
CZ Czech Republic No No Yes 2002 2006 2010
EE Estonia Partially1 No Yes 2003 2007 2011
FI Finland Yes No Yes 2003 2007 2011
FR France Yes Yes Yes 2002
DE Germany Yes Yes Yes 2002 2005
EL Greece Partially2 Yes Yes 2000 2004 2007 2009 2012
HU Hungary No No Yes 2006 2010
IT Italy Yes Yes Yes 2008 2013
LV Latvia No No Yes 2002 2006 2010 2011
NL Netherlands Yes Yes Yes 2002 2003 2006 2010 2012
NO Norway No No Yes 2001 2005 2009 2013
PL Poland No Yes Yes 2001 2005 2007
RO Romania No Yes Yes 2000 2004 2008 2012
SK Slovakia Partially3 Yes Yes 2002 2006 2010
ES Spain Yes Yes Yes 2000 2004 2008 2011
SE Sweden No No Yes 2002 2006 2010
UK United Kingdom No No Yes 2001 2005 2010 2015
Yes (or No) if the country is included (not included) in the corresponding set of regressions, either globalization shock or financial dependence. In
this table we are listing only the 19 countries for which we have complete data. Cyprus, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Switzerland have missing
detailed employment and imports data, therefore are not included in the analysis. 1 Since 2011. 2 Since 2001. 3 Since 2009.
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Table 3: Populist parties
Country Party
AT FPO
AT Alliance for the Future of Austria
AT Team Stronach
BE Vlaams Blok
BE FRONT NATIONAL
BE List Dedecker
BG NDSV
BG Coalition Ataka
BG Law, Order and Justice (Red, Zakonnost, Spravedlivost)
BG Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB)
CH Swiss People’s Party
CH Swiss Democrats
CH Lega dei Ticinesi
CH Geneva Citizen’s Movement
CZ ANO
CZ Public Affairs (Veci Verejne)
CZ Usvit
DE Die Linke (The Left)
DK Dansk Folkeparti
FI True Finns
FR FN (Front National)
GB British National Party
GB UK Independence Party
GR SYRIZA
GR ANEL
HR HSP-AS
HU FYD-HDF Fed.of Young Democrats and Hungarian Dem.Forum
HU Justice and Life Party (MIEP)
HU Movement for a Better Hungary
HU FIDESZ-MPSZ
IE Sinn Fein
IS Citizen’s Movement (BF)
IT Forza Italia
IT Lega Nord
IT Movimento Cinque Stelle
IT Il Popolo della Liberta (PdL)
LT Labour Party (DP)
LT Party ”Order and Justice” (TT)
LU Alternative Democratic Reform Party
LV For Fatherland and Freedom/ LNNK
LV All for Latvia
LV NA National Alliance
NL List Pim Fortuyn
NL Liveable Netherlands
NL Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV)
NO Progress Party (FrP)
NO Democrats
PL Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej
PL Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc
RO People’s Party
SE Sweden Democrats
SI Slovene National Party (SNS)
SK HZDS Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
SK SMER
SK KDH Christian Democratic Movement
SK Slovak National Party (SNS)
SK Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OLaNO)
The table presents the classification of populist parties according to van Kessel.
For a more detailed discussions on the countries covered and the methodology
followed by van Kessel (2015), see Guiso, Herrera, Morelli, Sonno (2017).
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Table 4: PSJ summary by Country (mean values over 2008-2014 period)
Country ID Country Eurozone PSJmp PSJmacro07 PSJ
macro
05−07 PSJ
ex
07−95 PSJ
ex
00−95
AT Austria Yes 1.730 0.153 0.157 0.905 0.884
BE Belgium Yes 1.700 1.049 1.053 0.946 0.882
BG Bulgaria No 0.000 -0.452 -0.497 0.000 0.000
HR Croatia No 0.000 -0.452 -0.497 0.000 0.000
CY Cyprus Yes . . . 1.046 0.972
CZ Czech Republic No 0.000 -0.452 -0.497 0.000 0.000
DK Denmark No 0.000 -0.452 -0.497 0.000 0.000
EE Estonia Yes 1.350 -0.128 -0.180 0.830 0.706
FI Finland Yes 1.303 -0.139 -0.191 0.882 0.862
FR France Yes 0.685 -0.114 -0.092 0.947 0.879
DE Germany Yes 1.408 0.036 0.143 0.872 0.825
EL Greece Yes 6.139 5.370 4.960 1.034 0.939
HU Hungary No 0.000 -0.452 -0.497 0.000 0.000
IS Iceland No 0.000 -0.452 -0.497 0.000 0.000
IE Ireland Yes 3.141 0.302 0.239 1.188 0.949
IT Italy Yes 1.176 1.442 1.753 1.151 1.044
LV Latvia Yes 0.000 -0.452 -0.497 0.198 0.198
LT Lithuania No 0.000 -0.452 -0.497 0.000 0.000
LU Luxembourg Yes 2.122 0.057 0.000 0.985 0.899
MT Malta Yes . . . 1.186 1.063
NL Netherlands Yes 1.794 -0.022 -0.076 0.985 0.902
NO Norway No 0.000 -0.452 -0.497 0.000 0.000
PL Poland No 0.000 -0.452 -0.497 0.000 0.000
PT Portugal Yes 1.547 0.259 1.258 1.069 0.950
RO Romania No 0.000 -0.452 -0.497 0.000 0.000
SK Slovakia Yes 0.000 -0.452 -0.497 1.504 0.986
SI Slovenia Yes 1.399 -0.116 -0.169 1.007 0.978
ES Spain Yes 3.944 0.495 0.427 1.086 0.943
SE Sweden No 0.000 -0.452 -0.497 0.000 0.000
CH Switzerland No 0.000 -0.452 -0.497 0.000 0.000
UK United Kingdom No 0.000 -0.452 -0.497 0.000 0.000
The PSJmp, PSJmacro07, and PSJmacro05−07 columns report mean values over the 2008-2014 period, while PSJ
ex
07−95 and
PSJex00−95 are country-specific, time-invariant measures. For a detailed description of each indicator refer to Section 3.
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Table 5: Globalization and populist vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Colantone & Stanig Full sample (excl. SE, NO, UK)
Populist % Populist % Populist % Populist % Populist %
GS 0.753* 3.966*** 0.528 2.802** -45.214**
(0.429) (1.066) (0.446) (1.382) (18.299)
GS × EZ 49.897***
(18.246)
Obs. 1,779 1,755 1,541 1,511 1,511
Adjusted-R2 0.907 0.905 0.919 0.918 0.918
NUTS level 3 3 3 3 3
FE Country × Year Country × Year Country × Year Country × Year Country × Year
Cluster SE NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3
Kleibergen-Paap F . . . . 17.55
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable Populist % is the vote share of populist
parties (see section 3). GS is the globalization shock index (see section 3). GS × EZ is the interaction term between the globalization
shock and the Eurozone dummy, equal to 1 if the country belongs to the Eurozone in the election-year. All columns are controlling for
GDP per capita growth rate at 1 year. Columns (1)-(2) use a sample of countries as close as possible to Colantone and Stanig (2017),
namely Austria, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. Columns (3)-(5) use our
own sample of Austria, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, excluding Sweden,
Norway, and the UK. Columns (2), (4), and (5) instrument the globalization shock with imports from China to the US (GS (US)).
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis globalization and populist vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
East West GDP per capita (pre-sample) EU membership
Populist % Populist % Populist % Populist %
GS -41.568** -1.445 -45.315** 16.531
(20.397) (2.364) (18.446) (19.031)
GS × EZ 6.118** 49.879*** 78.073***
(2.643) (18.389) (25.696)
GS × EU -89.933***
(29.619)
Obs. 233 1,755 1,511 1,511
Adjusted-R2 0.908 0.904 0.918 0.916
NUTS level 3 3 3 3
FE Country X Year Country X Year Country X Year Country X Year
Cluster SE NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3
Kleibergen-Paap F . 305.2 17.55 6.097
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable Populist % is the vote share
of populist parties (see Section 3). GS is the globalization shock index (see Section 3). GS × EZ is the interaction term be-
tween the globalization shock and the Eurozone dummy, equal to 1 if the country belongs to the Eurozone in the election-year.
All columns are controlling for GDP per capita growth rate at 1 year and the globalization shock is instrumented with imports
from China to the US (GS (US)). Column (1) restricts the sample to Eastern countries, namely Poland, Romania and Slovakia.
Conversely, column (2) only uses Western countries: Austria, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, and the UK. Column (3) adds the GDP per capita at the first available year as control. Finally, column (4) introduces
an additional interaction with EU, a dummy equal to 1 if the country belongs to the EU in the election-year.
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Table 7: Exclusion restriction globalization and populist vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
excl. DL excl. DI-DJ excl. DF excl. DB-DC
Populist % Populist % Populist % Populist %
GS -33.775* -49.675*** -45.678** -65.882***
(17.902) (18.853) (18.450) (18.904)
GS × EZ 42.228** 53.988*** 50.424*** 69.771***
(17.914) (18.772) (18.397) (18.913)
Obs. 1,511 1,511 1,511 1,511
Adjusted-R2 0.913 0.918 0.918 0.917
NUTS level 3 3 3 3
FE Country × Year Country × Year Country × Year Country × Year
Cluster SE NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3
Kleibergen-Paap F 19.32 17.23 17.00 20.11
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable Populist % is
the vote share of populist parties (see Section 3). GS is the globalization shock index (see Section 3). GS × EZ
is the interaction term between the globalization shock and the Eurozone dummy, equal to 1 if the country be-
longs to the Eurozone in the election-year. All columns are controlling for GDP per capita growth rate at 1 year.
All columns use our own sample of Austria, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland,
Romania, and Slovakia, excluding Sweden, Norway, and the UK. Column (1) instruments the globalization shock
with import from China to the US excluding the DL sector. Column (2) excludes instead sectors DI-DJ. Column
(3) excludes sector DF and finally, column (4) excludes sectors DB-DC.
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Table 8: Policy strait-jacket effects and the globalization shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SE SE, UK SE, UK, NO PSJex
Populist % Populist % Populist % Populist % Populist %
GS -45.240** -44.839** -44.844** -44.620** -44.561**
(18.324) (18.294) (18.297) (18.287) (18.284)
GS × EZ 49.925*** 49.506*** 49.512*** 44.950** 44.348**
(18.271) (18.241) (18.245) (18.283) (18.276)
GS × Western (1) 46.371**
(18.345)
GS × Western (2) 43.210**
(18.449)
GS × Western (3) 43.430**
(18.449)
GS × PSJex−7507−95 12.782***
(3.462)
GS × PSJex−7500−95 13.608***
(3.366)
Obs. 1,574 1,969 1,988 1,511 1,511
Adjusted-R2 0.918 0.916 0.916 0.907 0.906
NUTS level 3 3 3 3 3
FE Country × Year Country × Year Country × Year Country × Year Country × Year
Cluster SE NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3
P-value 0.015 0.019 0.022 . .
Kleibergen-Paap F 11.65 11.62 11.61 11.70 11.70
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable Populist % is the vote share of
populist parties (see Section 3). GS is the globalization shock index (see Section 3). GS × EZ is the interaction term between the
globalization shock and the Eurozone dummy, equal to 1 if the country belongs to the Eurozone in the election-year. All columns are
controlling for GDP per capita growth rate at 1 year. All columns instrument GS with imports from China to the US (GS (US)). Col-
umn (1) adds Sweden to the standard sample of Austria, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Romania,
and Slovakia. Western (1) is a dummy for Sweden, interacted with the globalization shock. Column (2) adds Sweden and the UK,
with Western (2) being the corresponding dummy. Finally, column (3) adds Sweden, the UK and Norway, with Western (3) being
the corresponding dummy. P-value refers to the test of statistical difference between the GS × EZ and the GS × Western coeffi-
cients. Columns (4)-(5) interact the globalization shock with PSJex−7507−95 and PSJ
ex−75
00−95 respectively (see Section 3) on the usual sample
of Austria, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.
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Table 9: Populism and the financial crisis
(1) (2) (3)
Populist % Populist % Populist %
Findep 28.747*** -0.502 -0.508
(6.036) (3.927) (3.927)
Findep × Crisis 88.087*** 39.070*
(12.831) (20.051)
Findep × Crisis × EZ 71.573***
(25.290)
Obs. 2,131 2,131 2,131
Adjusted-R2 0.928 0.931 0.932
NUTS level 3 3 3
FE Country × Year Country × Year Country × Year
Cluster SE NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent vari-
able Populist % is the vote share of populist parties (see Section 3). Findep is the financial
dependence indicator (see Section 3). Crisis is a dummy for years after 2008 (included). EZ is
the Eurozone dummy, equal to 1 if the country belongs to the Eurozone in the election-year. All
columns control for GDP per capita growth rate at 1 year and include all available countries:
Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Hun-
gary, Italy, Latvia, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia, and the UK.
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Table 10: Policy strait-jacket effects and the financial crisis shock
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Populist % Populist % Populist % Populist %
Findep -0.915 -0.478 -0.914 -0.478
(6.214) (3.974) (6.214) (3.974)
Findep × Crisis 39.515* 39.069* 39.507* 39.069*
(20.595) (20.075) (20.593) (20.075)
Findep × Crisis × EZ -10.657 -17.547 -17.548 -17.547
(35.798) (29.935) (29.936) (29.935)
Findep × PSJmacro−7507 1.155
(6.293)
Findep × PSJmacro−7507 × Crisis × EZ 96.064***
(32.910)
Findep × PSJmacro−9007 -1.554
(7.649)
Findep × PSJmacro−9007 × Crisis × EZ 114.812***
(28.454)
Findep × PSJmacro−7505−07 1.144
(6.292)
Findep × PSJmacro−7505−07 × Crisis × EZ 112.114***
(27.740)
Findep × PSJmacro−9005−07 -1.554
(7.649)
Findep × PSJmacro−9005−07 × Crisis × EZ 114.812***
(28.454)
Obs. 2,123 2,123 2,123 2,123
Adjusted-R2 0.932 0.932 0.932 0.932
NUTS level 3 3 3 3
FE Country × Year Country × Year Country × Year Country × Year
Cluster SE NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable Populist % is the vote share of
populist parties (see Section 3). Findep is the financial dependence indicator (see Section 3). Crisis is a dummy for years after 2008
(included). EZ is the Eurozone dummy, equal to 1 if the country belongs to the Eurozone in the election-year. All columns control
for GDP per capita growth rate at 1 year and include all available countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia,
Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia, and the UK.
The columns alternatively add interactions with the PSJmacro measures described in Section 3: both computed at 2007 or as mean
of 2005-2007 and both at the 75th or 90th percentiles.
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Figure 1: Trust in EP (2000 = 100)
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Figure 2: Trust in ECB (2000 = 100)
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Figure 3: Trust in EC (2000 = 100)
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Figure 4: Membership in EU good (2000 = 100)
90
10
0
11
0
12
0
13
0
14
0
M
em
be
rs
hip
 in
 E
U 
go
od
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Year
Euro No Euro
No Euro (East) No Euro (West)
Membership in EU good (2000 = 100)
32
Figure 5: Trust in EP (rate 2014-2007) over PSJmacro
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Figure 6: Trust in ECB (rate 2014-2007) over PSJmacro
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Figure 7: Trust in EC (rate 2014-2007) over PSJmacro
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Figure 8: Membership in EU good (rate 2014-2007) over PSJmacro
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Figure 9: Trust in EP (rate 2014-2007) over PSJmp
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Figure 10: Trust in ECB (rate 2014-2007) over PSJmp
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Figure 11: Trust in EC (rate 2014-2007) over PSJmp
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Figure 12: Membership in EU good (rate 2014-2007) over PSJmp
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Appendix
A A simple model
The purpose of this model is to show that, under simple assumptions, after Chinese
entry (in both markets, WE and EE) firm relocation incentives (from one market to the
other) increase, moreover the exit incentives are higher within the Eurozone.
The relocation argument outlined in the text can be summarized by the following table:
Profits in WE Profits in EE Differential
Before Chinese Entry piWE > 0 piEE > 0 piEE − piWE < R
After Chinese Entry piWEC < pi
WE piEEC < pi
EE piEEC − piWEC > R
where pi are the firm’s profits and R its relocation costs.
In sum, competition from China erodes profits everywhere, but if the erosion of profits is
larger in WE than in EE, then relocation from west to east is more likely after Chinese entry.
More specifically, more firms are likely to have a relocation cost in this profit differential,
the larger this gap is:
R ∈ (piEE − piWE, piEEC − piWEC )
In other words, the likelihood of relocation is increasing in the gap size:
Γ :=
(
piEEC − piWEC
)− (piEE − piWE) = ∆piWE −∆piEE
where
∆piWE := piWE − piWEC , ∆piEE := piEE − piEEC
is the profit erosion in each country after Chinese entry.
Simple standard assumptions, such as monopoly power, linear demand and constant
marginal costs, generate the results above. Namely, assume the global market demand for
a given product is linear, namely:
q = a− p
Assume, before Chinese entry, a WE firm acts as monopolist of this product. This firm
will experience different production costs in different countries: in WE the marginal cost
is constant and equal to cWE. Thus, the optimal monopoly pricing and profits are:
piWE = (a− p) (p− cWE)
p∗WE =
a+ cWE
2
→ pi∗WE =
(
a− cWE
2
)2
Assume Chinese entry disciplines prices downward, so that the firms cannot sell above
a certain price k. Namely profits become:
piWEC = (a− k) (k − cWE)
Hence, the (absolute value of the) drop in profits in WE due to Chinese entry becomes:
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∆piWE =
(
a− cWE
2
)2
− (a− k) (k − cWE)
Likewise in EE, where the production costs are lower, namely the marginal cost is
cEE < cWE.
The optimal monopoly pricing and profits are:
p∗EE =
a+ cEE
2
→ pi∗EE =
(
a− cEE
2
)2
Thus, likewise the drop in profits in EE after Chinese entry becomes:
∆piEE =
(
a− cEE
2
)2
− (a− k) (k − cEE)
Hence, after Chinese entry the profit loss in WE is larger than the profit loss in EE if:
∆piWE −∆piEE = (cWE − cEE)
(
2a+ cWE + cEE
4
− k
)
> 0
→ k < 2a+ cWE + cEE
4
In sum, if Chinese produces are competitive enough, namely if the price ceiling imposed
by Chinese entry k is low enough, then profit erosion due to Chinese entry is larger in WE
than in EE, thus after entry relocation to EE becomes a more profitable strategy. This
simple framework also delivers another prediction: the chance of firm relocation increases
in the competitiveness of Chinese products, lower k, and on the cost differential between
WE and EE (cWE − cEE) .
If, after Chinese entry, the loss of competitiveness and consequent currency depreciation
generates a cost differential between Euro Zone countries (EZ) and not (NEZ) cEZ > cNEZ ,
then EZ countries, such as Italy, will suffer more from relocation than NEZ countries, such
as the UK, whose currency, being not part of the Euro Zone, will depreciate more.
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B Detailed descriptive statistics
Table A1: Summary statistics by EZ and non-EZ area
N mean sd min max
Full sample (excl. SE, NO, UK) - Eurozone
Populist % 1942 6.331 13.215 0.000 66.883
Eurozone (EZ) 1942 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
EU 1942 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
GDP per capita (1 yr rate) 1688 1.625 4.156 -29.260 21.786
GDP per capita (pre-sample) 1736 21.357 9.395 2.500 81.100
GS 1310 0.209 0.303 -0.377 1.880
GS (US) 1329 0.487 0.450 -0.186 2.220
GS (US, excl. DL) 1329 0.296 0.260 -0.186 1.847
GS (US, excl. DI-DJ) 1329 0.442 0.414 -0.145 2.102
GS (US, excl. DF) 1329 0.487 0.449 -0.186 2.220
GS (US, excl. DB-DC) 1329 0.413 0.403 -0.119 2.144
PSJex07−95 1942 0.962 0.117 0.872 1.755
PSJex00−95 1942 0.890 0.076 0.825 1.236
Full sample (excl. SE, NO, UK) - No Euro
Populist % 774 19.867 18.191 0.000 73.563
Eurozone (EZ) 774 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
EU 774 0.612 0.488 0.000 1.000
GDP per capita (1 yr rate) 502 9.519 9.158 -26.829 42.857
GDP per capita (pre-sample) 584 4.217 5.268 0.800 46.300
GS 231 0.050 0.101 -0.251 0.385
GS (US) 225 0.729 0.521 0.051 2.149
GS (US, excl. DL) 225 0.608 0.452 0.035 1.982
GS (US, excl. DI-DJ) 225 0.669 0.493 0.022 2.067
GS (US, excl. DF) 225 0.725 0.521 0.051 2.149
GS (US, excl. DB-DC) 225 0.395 0.249 0.063 1.166
PSJex07−95 774 1.456 0.324 0.835 1.848
PSJex00−95 774 1.190 0.170 0.855 1.385
Full sample (incl. SE, NO, UK) - Eurozone
Populist % 1942 6.331 13.215 0.000 66.883
Eurozone (EZ) 1942 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
EU 1942 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
GDP per capita (1 yr rate) 1688 1.625 4.156 -29.260 21.786
GDP per capita (pre-sample) 1736 21.357 9.395 2.500 81.100
GS 1310 0.209 0.303 -0.377 1.880
GS (US) 1329 0.487 0.450 -0.186 2.220
GS (US, excl. DL) 1329 0.296 0.260 -0.186 1.847
GS (US, excl. DI-DJ) 1329 0.442 0.414 -0.145 2.102
GS (US, excl. DF) 1329 0.487 0.449 -0.186 2.220
GS (US, excl. DB-DC) 1329 0.413 0.403 -0.119 2.144
PSJex07−95 1942 0.962 0.117 0.872 1.755
PSJex00−95 1942 0.890 0.076 0.825 1.236
Findep 1441 0.047 0.029 0.005 0.134
PSJmacro07 1933 0.669 1.492 -0.395 5.624
PSJmacro05−07 1933 0.699 1.381 -0.441 5.208
Full sample (incl. SE, NO, UK) - No Euro
Populist % 1566 12.974 15.225 0.000 73.563
Eurozone (EZ) 1566 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
EU 1566 0.769 0.422 0.000 1.000
GDP per capita (1 yr rate) 1084 6.664 7.730 -26.829 45.000
GDP per capita (pre-sample) 1376 19.971 23.010 0.800 255.800
GS 883 0.180 0.156 -0.251 0.740
GS (US) 864 0.456 0.432 -0.162 2.149
GS (US, excl. DL) 864 0.282 0.360 -0.317 1.982
GS (US, excl. DI-DJ) 864 0.432 0.386 -0.126 2.067
GS (US, excl. DF) 864 0.456 0.430 -0.161 2.149
GS (US, excl. DB-DC) 864 0.335 0.294 -0.166 1.542
PSJex07−95 1566 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PSJex00−95 1566 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Findep 1011 0.040 0.023 0.005 0.130
PSJmacro07 1399 -0.452 0.000 -0.452 -0.452
PSJmacro05−07 1399 -0.497 0.000 -0.497 -0.497
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C First stages
Table A2: Globalization and populist vote - First stages Table 5
First stage: GS (2) (4) (5)
GS (US) 0.396*** 0.318*** 0.048***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.008)
GS (US) × EZ 0.360***
(0.019)
First stage: GS × EZ
GS (US) -0.001
(0.002)
GS (US) × EZ 0.409***
(0.017)
Kleibergen-Paap F . . 17.55
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. GS is the globalization shock index (see Section 3), based on
imports from China to the European countries in our sample, and it
is instrumented using imports from China to the US (GS (US)). GS
× EZ is the interaction term between the globalization shock and
the Eurozone dummy, equal to 1 if the country belongs to the Eu-
rozone in the election-year, instrumented with the same interaction
using imports from China to the US instead of European countries
(GS (US)). The column number refers to the corresponding column
in Table 5.
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Table A3: Sensitivity analysis globalization and populist vote - First stages Table 6
First stage: GS (1) (2) (3) (4)
GS (US) 0.052*** 0.315*** 0.048*** 0.033***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005)
GS (US) × EZ 0.094*** 0.362*** 0.348***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
GS (US) × EU 0.026*
(0.016)
First stage: GS × EZ
GS (US) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
GS (US) × EZ 0.409*** 0.411*** 0.409***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
GS (US) × EU 0.000
(0.001)
First stage: GS × EU
GS (US) -0.001
(0.002)
GS (US) × EZ 0.348***
(0.022)
GS (US) × EU 0.060***
(0.014)
Kleibergen-Paap F . 305.2 17.55 6.097
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. GS is
the globalization shock index (see Section 3), based on imports from China to
the European countries in our sample, and it is instrumented using imports from
China to the US (GS (US)). GS × EZ is the interaction term between the glob-
alization shock and the Eurozone dummy, equal to 1 if the country belongs to
the Eurozone in the election-year, instrumented with the same interaction using
imports from China to the US instead of European countries (GS (US)). Simi-
lary, GS × EU is the interaction between the globalization shock the EU dummy,
equal to 1 if the country belongs to the EU in the election-year, instrumented
with the same interaction using imports from China to the US instead of Euro-
pean countries (GS (US)). The column number refers to the corresponding col-
umn in Table 6.
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Table A4: Exclusion restriction globalization and populist vote - First stages of Table 7
First stage: GS (1) (2) (3) (4)
GS (US, excl. DL) 0.053***
(0.009)
GS (US, excl. DL) × EZ 0.429***
(0.039)
GS (US, excl. DI-DJ) 0.047***
(0.008)
GS (US, excl. DI-DJ) × EZ 0.382***
(0.020)
GS (US, excl. DF) 0.047***
(0.009)
GS (US, excl. DF) × EZ 0.360***
(0.019)
GS (US, excl. DB-DC) 0.126***
(0.020)
GS (US, excl. DB-DC) × EZ 0.357***
(0.027)
First stage: GS × EZ
GS (US, excl. DL) -0.000
(0.002)
GS (US, excl. DL) × EZ 0.482***
(0.038)
GS (US, excl. DI-DJ) -0.001
(0.002)
GS (US, excl. DI-DJ) × EZ 0.430***
(0.019)
GS (US, excl. DF) -0.001
(0.002)
GS (US, excl. DF) × EZ 0.409***
(0.017)
GS (US, excl. DB-DC) -0.002
(0.002)
GS (US, excl. DB-DC) × EZ 0.485***
(0.018)
Kleibergen-Paap F 19.32 17.23 17.00 20.11
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. GS is the
globalization shock index (see Section 3), based on imports from China to the European
countries in our sample, and it is instrumented using imports from China to the US (GS
(US)). GS × EZ is the interaction term between the globalization shock and the Euro-
zone dummy, equal to 1 if the country belongs to the Eurozone in the election-year, in-
strumented with the same interaction using imports from China to the US instead of Eu-
ropean countries (GS (US)). The instruments alternatively exclude the DL, DI-DJ, DF,
or DB-DC sectors from the computation of GS (US). The column number refers to the
corresponding column in Table 7.
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Table A5: Policy strait-jacket effects and the globalization shock - First stages Table 8
First stage: GS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GS (US) 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
GS (US) × EZ 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.341*** 0.340***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012)
GS (US) × Western (1) 0.274***
(0.025)
GS (US) × Western (2) 0.266***
(0.012)
GS (US) × Western (3) 0.268***
(0.013)
GS (US) × PSJex−7507−95 0.059
(0.053)
GS (US) × PSJex−7500−95 0.060
(0.051)
First stage: GS × EZ
GS (US) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
GS (US) × EZ 0.409*** 0.409*** 0.409*** 0.391*** 0.390***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008)
GS (US) × Western (1) 0.001
(0.002)
GS (US) × Western (2) 0.001
(0.001)
GS (US) × Western (3) 0.001
(0.001)
GS (US) × PSJex−7507−95 0.059
(0.053)
GS (US) × PSJex−7500−95 0.059
(0.051)
First stage: GS × Western (1) GS × Western (2) GS × Western (3) GS × PSJex−7507−95 GS × PSJex−7500−95
GS (US) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
GS (US) × EZ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
GS (US) × Western (1) 0.321***
(0.024)
GS (US) × Western (2) 0.314***
(0.009)
GS (US) × Western (3) 0.316***
(0.009)
GS (US) × PSJex−7507−95 0.448***
(0.053)
GS (US) × PSJex−7500−95 0.447***
(0.050)
Kleibergen-Paap F 11.65 11.62 11.61 11.70 11.70
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. GS is the globalization shock index (see Section 3), based on imports
from China to the European countries in our sample, and it is instrumented using imports from China to the US (GS (US)). GS × EZ is the
interaction term between the globalization shock and the Eurozone dummy, equal to 1 if the country belongs to the Eurozone in the election-year,
instrumented with the same interaction using imports from China to the US instead of European countries (GS (US)). Western (1) to (3) are
dummies for Sweden, Sweden and UK, Sweden, UK and Norway respectively. PSJex−7507−95 and PSJ
ex−75
00−95 are alternative measures of PSJ described
in Section 3. The column number refers to the corresponding column in Table 8.
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